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Animals try to make sense of sensory information frommultiple modalities by categorizing
them into perceptions of individual or multiple external objects or internal concepts. For
example, the brain constructs sensory, spatial representations of the locations of visual
and auditory stimuli in the visual and auditory cortices based on retinal and cochlear
stimulations. Currently, it is not known how the brain compares the temporal and spatial
features of these sensory representations to decide whether they originate from the
same or separate sources in space. Here, we propose a computational model of how
the brain might solve such a task. We reduce the visual and auditory information to
time-varying, finite-dimensional signals. We introduce controlled, leaky integrators as
working memory that retains the sensory information for the limited time-course of task
implementation. We propose our model within an evidence-based, decision-making
framework, where the alternative plan units are saliency maps of space. A spatiotemporal
similarity measure, computed directly from the unimodal signals, is suggested as the
criterion to infer common or separate causes. We provide simulations that (1) validate
our model against behavioral, experimental results in tasks where the participants were
asked to report common or separate causes for cross-modal stimuli presented with
arbitrary spatial and temporal disparities. (2) Predict the behavior in novel experiments
where stimuli have different combinations of spatial, temporal, and reliability features.
(3) Illustrate the dynamics of the proposed internal system. These results confirm our
spatiotemporal similarity measure as a viable criterion for causal inference, and our
decision-making framework as a viable mechanism for target selection, which may be
used by the brain in cross-modal situations. Further, we suggest that a similar approach
can be extended to other cognitive problems where working memory is a limiting factor,
such as target selection among higher numbers of stimuli and selections among other
modality combinations.
Keywords: causal inference, decision-making, multisensory integration, working memory, spatiotemporal
similarity, saliency map of space, report of sameness
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INTRODUCTION
Sensory systems detect different types of signals originating
from objects in the surrounding environment. For example,
visual information is carried by electromagnetic waves with a
specific range of frequencies, whereas auditory information is
carried by mechanical waves with a certain range of frequencies.
Our brain constructs various perceptions and plans various
actions in space and time, which can be triggered by sensations
from multiple modalities. Integration of multimodal sensory
information has been studied for temporal perceptions, e.g.,
perception of duration (Burr et al., 2009; Klink et al., 2011)
and simultaneity (Harrar and Harris, 2008; Virsu et al., 2008),
for spatial perceptions, e.g., spatial localization (Alais and Burr,
2004) and motion direction perception (Sadaghiani et al., 2009),
for causal inference (Slutsky and Recanzone, 2001; Wallace et al.,
2004), and also for action (Frens et al., 1995; Van Wanrooij
et al., 2009). Here we are concerned with how the multisensory
information is processed for causal inference.
Causal inference in animals is the process of estimating what
events in outside world has caused the sensory representations
in the brain (Shams and Beierholm, 2010; Lochmann and
Deneve, 2011). In presence of multiple sensory representations,
we compare their features to infer if they have a unique
cause or not. A commonly studied case is when visual and
auditory information is used to construct spatial and temporal
perceptual features. If the temporal features are similar to each
other, a common cause may be perceived overriding mismatches
in their spatial features (Vroomen et al., 2001a,b; Godfroy
et al., 2003). Similarly, if the spatial features are similar to
each other, a common cause may again be perceived despite
mismatches between temporal features (Vroomen and Keetels,
2006; Vroomen and Stekelenburg, 2011). These spatial and
temporal binding effects break down at large spatial or temporal
disparities (Slutsky and Recanzone, 2001; Wallace et al., 2004). In
this paper we intend to propose a unique mechanism for causal
inference which explains all this seemingly disparate evidence.
However, let’s first review some previous attempts on solving this
problem.
In one study (Alais and Burr, 2004), observers were asked
to report the location of a stimulus consisting of a flash and
click presented with a spatial conflict. The spatial reliability
of the visual signal was varied. The participants were told
that the flash and click belonged to a unique object. For the
case of the most conspicuous visual stimuli they observed the
classical ventriloquist effect such that the participants perceive
the object close to the position of the visual stimulus. For
heavily blurred visual stimuli, they perceive the object close to
the auditory stimulus. For intermediate levels of blurriness, they
perceive the object somewhere between the positions of the
visual and auditory stimuli. Their results imply that, when the
observers assume a common cause for the cross-modal stimuli,
an intermediate position closer to the more reliable of the stimuli,
is perceived as the location of the common cause. This idea
wasmodeled, assuming Gaussian distributions for the unisensory
cues, by Bayesian integration of the distributions, leading to the
average of the two position cues weighted by the inverse of the
variances of their distributions (Alais and Burr, 2004). Others
tried to implement this optimal integration by a single-neuron
model (Patton and Anastasio, 2003) or a model of a population
of neurons (Ma et al., 2006).
Other experimental studies let the participants decide whether
two cross-modal signals belonged to a unique object or not
(Slutsky and Recanzone, 2001; Wallace et al., 2004). Such studies
changed the spatial and temporal relationships between the two
stimuli. For very short-duration and synchronous stimuli, the
participants reported a unique object as the source of the signals
and perceived it at the weighted average of the position of the two
signals. When the presentation time was extended or temporal
disparity was introduced between the signals, the chance of
reporting a unique cause for two spatially disparate signals
decreased drastically. Also for synchronous stimuli, increasing
the spatial disparity between the stimuli decreased the percentage
of the trials in which the participants reported a unique object
as the source. Their results showed that when participants are
not told to assume a common source for the stimuli, they might
localize the stimuli in common or separate spatial positions
depending on the spatial and temporal features of the stimuli.
Some theoretical studies have tried to model the effect of
spatial disparity (Hairston et al., 2003) on the report of a common
cause (Körding et al., 2007; Sato et al., 2007). However, these
studies ignored the temporal effect. They used the uncertain
spatial cues, detected through multiple sensory channels, to
calculate the probabilities of them arising from same or separate
sources. If the same source is more likely, these models calculate
the optimal estimate of the location of the same source as
the weighted average of the cues. If separate sources are more
likely, the models shown that the uncertain spatial cues are the
best estimates of the two locations. A physiologically realistic
framework for these models has not been offered (Ma and
Rahmati, 2013). Some other theoretical studies reduce the
criterion for fusion to the temporal features of the events, ignore
the spatial disparity, and propose that the cross-modal events
are bound together if they happen within a relative time window
(Colonius and Diederich, 2010; Diederich and Colonius, 2015).
Here we want to propose a more general approach which
considers the spatial and temporal dimensions in a common
framework. We suggest a model of how the brain solves the
causal inference problem for spatial localization for cross-
modal, audiovisual stimuli with arbitrary spatial and temporal
disparities. We propose the model at the computational level
(Marr, 1982), not assuming a specific probability distribution
or neural representation for the spatial position of the stimuli.
We consider two stimuli, visual and auditory, with only spatial
and temporal features. However, other problems with more
than two stimuli, or with other modality combinations, or
with stimuli of semantic or emotional significance can also
be tackled by our approach. We consider the stimuli to be
composed of multidimensional, time-varying, position signals
which communicate the time and place of the stimuli. Our
model is proposed within an evidence-based decision making
framework including a short-term memory, in the form of a
leaky integrator, and a spatiotemporal similarity measure as
the criterion for inferring the cause of the input signals. The
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short-term memory retains spatial information (not information
about the order and temporal interrelations of events) and
our similarity measure captures spatial and temporal disparities
between the stimuli (not a higher-level order relation between
them in time or space). We use this model to simulate known
psychophysical results, and to generate predictions that can be
used to test the model. Such results demonstrate that a model
constructed in a decision making framework and inferring a
causal structure based on a spatiotemporal similarity measure
explains the behavioral results and could possibly be used by the
brain to solve the target selection problem when cross-modal
stimuli are presented.
MODEL OVERVIEW
The problem we are addressing is causal inference in localization
of cross-modal stimuli in which the spatiotemporal properties
of the components vary. To solve this problem, we borrow
two popular concepts from cognitive neuroscience that (perhaps
surprisingly) have not yet been incorporated into models
of multisensory spatial integration: decision making (Wang,
2008), and working memory (Baddeley, 2003b). Although the
computations in this model could pertain to any cognitive or
behavioral use of causal inference from multimodal inputs, we
designed this model with output to the gaze control system in
mind, because this is one of the best understood systems in
the brain (Bell et al., 2005) and because numerous gaze-control
laboratories are capable of testing our predictions. Thus, one can
think of the output of the model as dictating whether a gaze-shift
will be made toward the visual stimulus, the auditory stimulus,
or a combined representation derived from both. Finally, we have
arranged the general order and nature of our model algorithms to
be compatible with the known biology of these systems but focus
the current study on replicating and predicting psychophysical
results.
The sensory information received from stimuli in the
environment is transient as most stimuli are only present for
a limited time. Sensory information about the position and
reliability of multimodal stimuli is moved to, and temporarily
stored in, working memory where operations such as integration
and computation of similarity take place. Working memory, in
general, is used to bring together different pieces of information
for cognitive processing with the goal of performing tasks such as
reasoning, problem solving or action planning (D’Esposito et al.,
1995; Baddeley, 2003a). Working memory is a distributed system
in the brain, with multiple brain areas activated depending
on the specific task being implemented (Courtney et al., 1997;
Haxby et al., 2000; Fuster, 2004). Working memory in our
model comprises four computational units (shown in blue in
Figure 1) that are responsible for retaining sensory information,
integrating spatial cues, computing a similarity measure, and
feeding the decision-making circuitry (Bechara et al., 1998).
We propose our model within a decision-making framework.
Decision making is the process of deliberation resulting in the
commitment to one of multiple alternative plans (Gold and
Shadlen, 2007; Heekeren et al., 2008; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010).
The deliberative process consists in the accumulation of evidence
through processing the available information. This is realized in
the evolution of systemic decision variables through time. The
result of the decision is determined by a rule which is applied
to the decision variables. Decision rules determine how or when
the decision variable is interpreted to arrive at a commitment
to a particular plan (Churchland et al., 2008). The decision
result is the output variable of the evidence accumulation and
rule application, that determines which plan is to be executed.
Accumulation of evidence changes the decision variables and
may change the decision result (Bogacz, 2007). As we shall see,
each of these features has been incorporated into our model
(green in Figure 1B).
The first part of the decision is to decide whether there
is a unique cause for the two signals or if they correspond
to two separate events. As explained before, the experimental
evidence shows that this decision is determined based on
the spatial and temporal relationship between the cross-modal
stimuli (Wallace et al., 2004). We propose a measure of
spatiotemporal similarity between the two received signals
that is used for making this decision. Figure 1A shows
how this measure is calculated in working memory. The
spatiotemporal pattern of stimuli presentation is captured in a
temporally changing spatial position signal, decoded from the
representations of sensory space in the brain. Spatial distance
(DIST) between the two stimuli, as a function of time, is
first calculated. Spatial distance is integrated through time to
calculate the spatiotemporal disparity (
−−→
DISP). Spatiotemporal
similarity measure (SIM) is calculated by applying a function that
inverts and normalizes the spatiotemporal disparity. This time-
varying, similarity measure decreases with increases in the spatial
disparity and/or temporal disparity between the two presented
stimuli.
The complete problem can be conceptualized as choosing
between three possible scenarios: (1) the signals are coming
from one same object. In this case the target for gaze-shift is
constructed as a weighted average of the visual and auditory
estimates. (2) The signals are coming from different objects and
the visual stimulus is more salient, in which case the target is
chosen to be at the location of the visual stimulus. (3) The signals
are coming from different objects and the auditory stimulus is
more salient, so, the target is chosen to be at the location of the
auditory stimulus. Thus, the main task for our model is to infer
one of these three scenarios from a given pair of multisensory
inputs.
The complete model is shown in Figure 1B. The inputs
to the system are the temporally changing position signals of
the visual and auditory stimuli along with their reliabilities
(
−→
V and
−→
A ). These spatial position signals are temporarily
stored in a memory structure (
−→
M ). The spatiotemporal similarity
measure (SIM) is computed from the position signals stored in
memory. The previously mentioned three possible scenarios are
physically realized in the form of three plan representations.
Each plan unit represents the potential goal for an attention
shift (if that plan wins) along with the saliency of the plan.
The visual (
−−−→
PL_V) and auditory (
−−−→
PL_A) plan units represent the
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Computation of the spatiotemporal similarity measure and using it to make a call on the sameness of the cause of cross-modal signals. The
eye-centered, spatial components of the visual and auditory signals, which are stored in short-term memory (
−→
M ) are fed into the unit
−−→
DIST to calculate the spatial
distance between them as a function of time. The spatial distance is then sent to the unit
−−→
DISP, called spatiotemporal disparity, where it is integrated across time. The
spatiotemporal disparity is then sent to the unit SIM, called spatiotemporal similarity measure, where is goes through an inverting and normalizing function. The
spatiotemporal similarity measure is used for making a call on the sameness of the cause of the two received signals. This is done by sending the similarity measure to
the unit SAM, called sameness call, where a threshold function is applied to it. (B) The complete model of gaze-shift, target selection in cross-modal situations. The
visual (
−→
V ) and auditory (
−→
A ) signals are stored in a multisensory memory (
−→
M ) structure. In parallel, the visual and auditory signals are used for computation of
spatiotemporal similarity measure (SIM), as illustrated in detail in (A). The three alternative plans are constructed as saliency maps from the memorized information and
are represented initially in the plan layer in three units
−−−→
PL_V,
−−−→
PL_A, and
−−−−→
PL_AV. The unisensory plans are the unisensory stimulus positions along with their reliabilities
which are regarded as equivalent to their saliencies. The multisensory plan is the weighted average (by reliabilities) position of the cross-modal stimuli along with the
similarity measure as its saliency. The decision variable is constructed in the unit
−→
DV by communicating the saliencies of the three plans. The result of the decision is
computed in
−→
DR by a function which implements the idea that the multisensory plan wins if the similarity measure is greater than a threshold and the more reliable of
the unisensory plans wins if the similarity measure is lower than the threshold. The spatial components of the three plans are communicated from the plan layer to
three units
−−−→
EX_V,
−−−→
EX_A, and
−−−−→
EX_AV in the execution layer. The result of the decision is materialized by selective inhibition of the plan representations in the execution
layer. Only the winning plan is disinhibited, based on the decision result, and is sent for execution.
position of the corresponding stimuli along with their reliabilities
(Körding et al., 2007; Rowland et al., 2007; as our stimuli
don’t bear any emotional significance or semantic meaning,
their saliency is reduced to their reliability). Reliability in our
model is a one-dimensional, real-valued parameter, which can
change between 0 and 1 for the least to most reliable, and is
an input to the model. We presume that this reliability can be
calculated, upstream of our model, based on the representation
of the spatial position, e.g., the inverse of the variance for a
normal distribution (Körding et al., 2007; Ohshiro et al., 2011).
The multisensory plan (
−−−−→
PL_AV) unit represents average of the
positions of the two stimuli weighted in proportion to their
respective reliabilities (Alais and Burr, 2004). The saliency of the
multisensory plan is proposed to be the spatiotemporal similarity
measure.
The decision variable (
−→
DV) is constructed from the saliencies
of the three alternative plans. The decision on same or separate
causes for the signals is made by comparing the saliency of the
multisensory plan with a threshold. We assume this threshold
is tunable, and one possible way to account for the effects of
emotional or semantic value of stimuli on sensory fusion is to
be able to adjust this threshold. However, as this is beyond the
scope of our model, we set the threshold to 0.5 (to match the
experimental evidence, see below) and for consistency we use
the same value for all of our predictive simulations. As long
as saliency, i.e., the spatiotemporal similarity measure, is above
threshold the decision that they are from the same source is
preferred. If the similarity measure drops below threshold the
decision changes to that they originate from separate sources. In
this case, the decision concerning which cause forms the goal
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of a shift of attention is made by comparing the saliencies of
the two unisensory plans. The overall result of this three-way
decision (
−→
DR) is stored as a 3-D signal that allows communication
of only the winning plan to the execution units (
−−−→
EX_V ,
−−−→
EX_A,
−−−−→
EX_AV). This is implemented through the decision result.
−→
DR
keeps all EX units under constant inhibition. When a plan wins,
its corresponding EX unit is disinhibited.
The general outline of the model is inspired by known
properties of the visual, auditory, and gaze control systems.
The visual signal is the position of the visual stimulus in eye-
centered coordinates (Andersen et al., 1997; Maier and Groh,
2009). Auditory space is encoded initially in a craniocentric
frame of reference (Knudsen and Konishi, 1978; Knudsen and
Knudsen, 1983) as the auditory receptors are fixed to the head.
For multisensory information processing and motor planning,
the two sensory signals,
−→
V and
−→
A , should be in a common
reference frame (Jay and Sparks, 1987; Andersen et al., 1997)
which has been shown to be eye-centered for action involving
the gaze-control system and early aspects of reach planning
(Groh and Sparks, 1992; Cohen and Andersen, 2000; Pouget
et al., 2002). The sensory signals are then sent to the distributed
network of working memory. Posterior parietal and dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex have been shown to actively maintain such
signals (Funahashi et al., 1989; Cohen et al., 1997), similar to
the short-term memory
−→
M in our model. The prefrontal cortex
is involved in the higher-order, executive functions of working
memory (D’Esposito and Postle, 2015), including integration of
the signals into unique events, realized in our model through
−−→
DIST,
−−→
DISP, and
−−→
SIM. It is thought that the working memory
then feeds the plan representations of the decision making
circuitry in frontal cortex (Jones et al., 1977; Canteras et al.,
1990; Berendse et al., 1992; Yeterian and Pandya, 1994; Levesque
et al., 1996), like our plan representations in play layer PL. Plan
representations are then thought to send bids, e.g., their saliencies
as in our case, to a central arbitrating system (Redgrave et al.,
1999), e.g., the telencephalic decision centers, that gate their
access to effectors. This is represented in our model through
−→
DV
and
−→
DR and their connection which realizes a decision rule. The
basal ganglia are thought to receive the result of the decision from
cortex (Beiser and Houk, 1998; Koós and Tepper, 1999; Gernert
et al., 2000) and implement it through selective disinhibition
of cortical channels, which is abstracted in our model through
the multiplicative effect of the
−→
DR on plan representations in
execution layer EX. In order to plan a gaze-shift, for example,
the final winning plan is sent to the superior colliculus (Munoz
and Guitton, 1989; Klier et al., 2001). This command could then
be used to drive the eye-head coordination system (Klier et al.,
2003; Daemi and Crawford, 2015) to reorient the line of sight to
the appropriate target.
MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
Methods
Our model implements causal inference through a decision
making network for planning actions in a dynamic environment.
This contrasts to previous approaches which either described (1)
inference as chains of if-then rules which statically transform the
internal states of the system (Newell and Simon, 1972; Anderson,
1983) or (2) goal-directed motor planning within the time
constraints of environmental interactions (van Gelder, 1998).
While the former approach ignores the short-term dynamics of
perception and action, the latter ignores the internal system,
and sacrifices the high-level linguistic processes, such as complex
planning and deductive reasoning. Our goal was to integrate both
“dynamic perception/action” and “high-level inference” in a way
consistent with our knowledge of human and animal cognitive
systems (see Section Model Overview).
To do this, we adopt a unified approach where a model
is identified by functions of both the internal state variables
and the time. Inspired by the brain, such more general
models are realized through a distributed network of parallel
processing units. This approach simultaneously accounts for
syntactic manipulations of representations underlying inference,
and flexible control of information routing between different
units through time (Eliasmith, 2013). Although we do not deal
here with the neural implementation of the model, all the
representations and transformations are designed based on the
known neurophysiology, and can be neurally realized by a recent
theoretical approach, neural engineering framework, which
unifies the symbolic, connectionist, and dynamicist viewpoints
(Eliasmith and Anderson, 2003; Eliasmith et al., 2012). The
relatively high number of variables in such models is because
we are modeling an adaptive, robust biological system which can
behave and survive in an uncertain, changing environment.
More specifically, we implement an evidence-based decision
making process, whose representations are evolving through
time. The inference’s syntactic manipulations are realized
through selective inhibition of plan representations, as inspired
by the brain. Routing the information through the system is
realized in a unified architecture where all attractor networks
are controlled integrators which include a dimension (controlled
leak) whose value controls whether the structure updates its
value by it input, retains its current value, or clears its content.
Information routing is controlled by the dynamics of the system
not by the choice of modeler, as it is in the brain. As a result,
inference is realized through time, evolving as empirical evidence
is accumulated, helping us to survive in a highly dynamic
environment.
Unisensory Signals
When visual or auditory stimuli appear in the environment,
they get detected at specific spatial locations, within specific time
windows. The visual stimulus is encoded in retinal coordinates,
i.e., an eye-centered frame of reference. The auditory stimulus
is initially encoded relative to head, however, for cognitive
and motor purposes, this code is transformed into an eye-
centered reference frame as well (Maier and Groh, 2009). The
unisensory input signals in ourmodel are transient, time-varying,
four-dimensional vectors. The four dimensions include a first
component for existence of the signal, a second component for
reliability of the signal and two last components for the eye-
centered position of the signal in the spherical coordinates. The
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existence component gets value 1 or 0 based on whether or not
a stimulus is detected in the environment, by stimulation of
the sensory receptors. It controls the interaction of the sensory
information with memory (explained next). The reliability
component, changing between 0 and 1 for least to most reliable,
is computed from the early representation of the signal (Körding
et al., 2007; Ohshiro et al., 2011), and indicates how reliable the
representation is about the position of the stimulus.
EV(t) =


extv
relv
echv
ecvv

 (1)
EA(t) =


exta
rela
echa
ecva

 (2)
Short-Term Memory
The transiently presented sensory signals need to be temporarily
stored for further cognitive processing, e.g., inference (D’Esposito
et al., 1995; Baddeley, 2003a), and then feeding the decision
making circuitry. Accordingly, the unisensory signals are first
communicated a short-term memory structure. It is a state space
of finite dimensions which temporarily stores the unisensory
signals in a unique representation. It consists of leaky integrators
with controllable leaks. Sensory information is retained across
eight dimensions of this state space, four dimensions for each
modality. Those four modality-specific dimensions include a
first component controlling the integrator’s leak, and three
components storing the last three dimensions of the unisensory
signals:
EM(t) =


lkmv
relmv
echmv
ecvmv
lkma
relma
echma
ecvma


(3)
This memory structure, in connection with the transient sensory
signals, is governed by these nonlinear state-space equations.
In a general sense, such state space equations are the basis
of constructing attractor neural networks which is believed
to underlie memory structures in the brain (Conklin and
Eliasmith, 2005; Singh and Eliasmith, 2006). The boundary and
input conditions of these differential equations are dictated by
a dynamic environment. Therefore, the current state of the
state space is controlled internally, by the controllable leaks,
in constant interaction with the environment. However, more
specifically, before any input comes in, all dimensions of the state
space are zero.


lk˙mv
re˙lmv
ech˙mv
ecv˙mv
lk˙ma
rel˙ma
ech˙ma
ecv˙ma


=


00000000
0
(
1− lkmv
)
000000
00
(
1− lkmv
)
00000
000
(
1− lkmv
)
0000
00000000
00000
(
1− lkma
)
00
000000
(
1− lkma
)
0
0000000
(
1− lkma
)


×


lkmv
relmv
echmv
ecvmv
lkma
relma
echma
ecvma


+


10000000
01000000
00100000
00010000
00001000
00000100
00000010
00000001


×


extv
relv
echv
ecvv
exta
rela
echa
ecva


(4)
The controllable leaks characterize the behavior of the controlled
integrator (Table 1; Eliasmith, 2005). The two leaks are fed by the
existence component of the corresponding sensory input. The
existence component is 1 when the stimulus is present and is 0
when it is not, so the leaks always assume digital values 0 or 1.
This means the integrator is updated by the new input when the
input is present and maintains the current value when no input
is present.
Spatiotemporal Similarity Measure
The cognitive processing in working memory, in our model,
consists of computing a measure of similarity between the two
unisensory signals based on their spatial positions and temporal
profiles. Figure 1A illustrates the connectivity of structures for
calculating this measure. We start with the spatial distance
DIST. The spatial distance between the two unisensory stimuli is
calculated from the information stored in the short-termmemory
about the spatial positions of the stimuli. It is computed, in
spherical coordinates, in the connection from EM to DIST:
DIST (t) =
[
dist
]
= cos−1
[
cos
(
echmv
)
× cos
(
echma
)
+ sin
(
echmv
)
× sin
(
echma
)
× cos (ecvmv − ecvma)] (5)
The spatiotemporal disparity
−−→
DISP is then calculated from the
spatial distance by integrating it across time. Our proposed
structure is a state space of two dimensions. This is, again, a leaky
TABLE 1 | The effect of the leak on the behavior of a leaky integrator.
Leak = 0 Leak = 1
No input coming Keeps the current value Clears the memory
Input coming Integrates and accumulates the input Updates to the input
Theoretically speaking, if the leak gets a value between 0 and 1, when there is no input
the integrator clears the memory with a speed controlled by the leak, and when there is
an input the integrator integrates the input with a speed controlled by the leak. However,
both our integrator structures always assume digital values of 0 or 1.
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integrator with controllable leak. The two dimensions of this state
space include a first component controlling the integrator’s leak
and a second component where the integrated value of the spatial
distance is accumulated.
−−→
DISP(t) =
[
lkdisp
disp
]
(6)
These state space equations characterize the behavior of this
integrator. Before introduction of inputs, all dimensions of the
state space are zero.
[
lkdisp
disp
]
=
[
0 0
0 (1− lkdisp)
]
×
[
lkdisp
disp
]
+
[
0
1
]
× [dist] (7)
Here, the leak does not need to be controlled based on existence
of the input. The leak is internal to the functioning of the
integrator, and represents a value 0 all through the stimulus
presentation window. That is because we want it to integrate
the input when there is any, and retain the current value when
there is no input (Table 1). The result of this integration gives
us a measure of spatiotemporal disparity between the visual and
auditory stimuli. A tangent hyperbolic function is then applied on
the disparity measure to calculate a measure of similarity between
the two stimuli:
SIM (t) = [sim] = 1 − tanh
(
0.5× disp
)
(8)
This makes the similarity measure change between 0 and 1 for
the least to the most similar. Equations in this section might not
be supported by a known brain mechanism, however, we will
later show that using spatiotemporal similarity as the criterion
to infer unique or separate causes can explain the experimental
evidence about the relation of such judgements with the spatial
and temporal disparities between cross-modal stimuli.
Decision Making Process
The information processed in working memory is then
communicated to the decision making circuitry (Bechara et al.,
1998), which realizes the causal inference in our model. We
introduce three plan units, visual, auditory and multisensory,
which are fed by the working memory. Each of these channels
is a 3-dimensional vector whose first component represents the
saliency of that plan. The saliency of each of the unisensory plans
is reduced to its reliability. The last two components of the two
unisensory plans represent their respective spatial positions as
stored in short-term memory:
−−−→
PL_V (t) =

 salplvechplv
ecvplv

 =

 relmvechmv
ecvmv

 (9)
−−−→
PL_A(t) =

 salplaechpla
ecvpla

 =

 relmaechma
ecvma

 (10)
Integration of the unimodal signals, which might be used
to drive a gaze-shift, is implemented in working memory,
in its connection to multisensory plan representation. The
multisensory channel represents a weighted average of the
positions of the two stimuli, weighted by their reliabilities.
The saliency of the multisensory plan is considered to be the
spatiotemporal similarity between the two stimuli, which varies
between 0, for least similar, and 1, for most similar:
−−−−→
PL_AV (t) =

 salplavechplav
ecvplav


=

 simrelmv × echmv + relma × echma
relmv × ecvmv + relma × ecvma

 (11)
Now, we are ready to construct our decision variable, realizing
a central decision center (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). We propose
a three-dimensional vector as the decision variable
−→
DV which
is completely characterized by the saliency of the plan (PL)
representations:
−→
DV (t) =

 dvvdva
dvav

 =

 salplvsalpla
salplav

 (12)
The values of the components of
−→
DV determine the decision
about which of the visual, auditory or multisensory channels
drives the final goal of gaze-shift. The result of this decision is to
disinhibit the desired channel and keep inhibiting the undesired
ones (explained below). The result of the decisionmaking process
is temporarily stored in another structure that we call ‘decision
result’ or
−→
DR. The decision function, which transforms
−→
DV to
−→
DR,
is the abstract underlying mechanism of inference in our model,
and is formed through this idea:
Decision Result =



10
0

 if sim > threshold

01
0

 if sim < threshold and relv > rela

00
1

 if sim < threshold and rela > relv
(13)
Which is mathematically realized by this proposed functionality:
−→
DR (t) =

drvdra
drav

 =


1
1+ e−slav(thav−dvav)
×
1
1+ e−slu(dvv−dva)
1
1+ e−slav(thav−dvav)
×
1
1+ e−slu(dva−dvv)
1
1+ e−slav(dvav−thav)


(14)
thav is the tunable threshold for the similarity measure above
which we perceive the two signals as coming from the same object
and below which we can differentiate the cause of the two signals.
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slav and slu are function parameters which determine the speed
and confidence of the transition between alternative decisions.
The decision result controls the communication of the plan
representations from the plan layer, PL, to the execution layer,
EX. Accordingly, the plan representations in EX are governed by:
−−−→
EX_V (t) =
[
echexv
ecvexv
]
= drv ×
[
echplv
ecvplv
]
(15)
−−−→
EX_A (t) =
[
echexa
ecvexa
]
= dra ×
[
echpla
ecvpla
]
(16)
−−−−→
EX_AV (t) =
[
echexav
ecvexav
]
= drav ×
[
echplav
ecvplav
]
(17)
−→
DR implements the decision concerning which plan drives
the gaze-shift. This is applied by selective inhibition of
plan representations in the execution layer (EX). EX plan
representations are selectively inhibited to determine the winning
plan. Here, this is shown by the multiplicative effect of
the corresponding
−→
DR component. Such functionality can be
neurophysiologically realized by an inhibitory connection from
a neural population representing
−→
DR to the neural populations
representing the execution layer (EX) plans (Redgrave et al., 1999;
Sajad et al., 2015).
RESULTS
Psychophysicists record the observable behavior of subjects
during experiments. However, the neurocognitive internal
system underlying the behavior is not accessible to the
psychophysicist. For example, for causal inference studies in
cross-modal spatial localization, the “report of sameness” is the
only measureable behavior, while the whole host of internal
mechanisms, e.g., sensory representations, working memory and
decision making units, which are responsible for the behavior
are not measurable. In this paper we propose a model of the
internal cognitive system underlying the implementation of such
tasks. In this section: (1) we verify our model against the limited
number of psychophysical studies of causal inference during
cross-modal spatial localizations which systematically varied
both the spatial and temporal features (Slutsky and Recanzone,
2001; Wallace et al., 2004). We do so (in Section Inference
of a Unique Cause for Cross-Modal Stimuli) by comparing
our model’s output with the only measureable behavior “report
of sameness” in such experiments. (2) At this stage, we have
verified the ability of the model to reproduce the human behavior
when the spatial and temporal configurations of the cross-modal
stimuli are varied. We then look into the internal system by
illustrating the dynamics of the decision variable and decision
result when we change the spatial (Section Effect of Spatial
Disparity) or temporal (Section Effect of Temporal Disparity)
disparities between the stimuli. (3) We then use the model
to predictively simulate the human behavior in some novel
situations where experimental evidence is not yet available. We
first simulate what happens when the reliability of the stimuli
vary, when separate sources are perceived (Section Effect of
Stimulus Reliability). Then we will illustrate how accumulation of
evidence through exposure of the model to temporally extended
stimulus presentations may change the decision (Section Effect of
Evidence Accumulation).
Inference of a Unique Cause for
Cross-Modal Stimuli
The percentage of the times that an audio-visual stimulus is
judged as arising from a unique cause varies with the spatial
and temporal features of the stimuli (Slutsky and Recanzone,
2001; Wallace et al., 2004). Slutsky and Recanzone (2001) kept
the position, duration, and onset of the auditory stimulus fixed,
and varied the onset and position of the visual stimulus and
found how this report of unique cause changes. They found that
a unique cause was elicited for small temporal disparities even at
large spatial disparities, and also for large temporal disparities for
small spatial disparities (Slutsky and Recanzone, 2001).
Figure 2 shows the output of our model when stimulus
parameters are varied in the same way as Slutsky and Recanzone
(2001). Our proposed criterion for this decision is the measure of
spatiotemporal similarity. This measure is shown as a function of
temporal disparity for different spatial disparities in Figure 2A
and as a function of spatial disparities for different temporal
disparities in Figure 2B. The decision is made by applying a
threshold (set to 0.5 throughout all of our simulations) function
to the similarity measure: if it is above threshold, the decision is
that there is a unique cause, if it is below threshold the decision
is that there are separate causes. The results of this decision
are shown in Figure 2C as a function of temporal disparity for
different spatial disparities and in Figure 2D as a function of
spatial disparities for different temporal disparities.
The average percentage of the reports of a unique cause,
among a number of participants and through multiple trials,
changing by the spatial and temporal disparities, follow a
meaningful pattern, as experimentally observed (Slutsky and
Recanzone, 2001). This pattern is closely captured by the trends
produced by our model which infers the causal structure based
on the spatiotemporal similarity. Unique cause is predicted for a
wide range of temporal disparities if the spatial disparity is very
small, as shown in Figures 2A,C for a spatial disparity of 1.83◦
(ventriloquism effect). The “sameness call” changes at some point
for most spatial disparities if the temporal disparity becomes
greater than threshold. Similarly, the “sameness call” changes
for a given temporal disparity if the spatial disparity exceeds
some threshold. Thus, although we did not tinker extensively
with our model parameters to exactly match the experimental
results quantitatively, we conclude that the model replicates the
key results and principles of the published experiment.
Effect of Spatial Disparity
Spatial proximity is one of the features used to judge whether or
not two signals have a common source (Hairston et al., 2003;
Wallace et al., 2004). Figure 3 shows the performance of our
model for a task in which visual and auditory stimuli have the
same onset time (0.2 s) and duration (0.3 s). While the position of
the visual stimulus was fixed, the position of the auditory stimuli
was varied systematically (spatial disparities from 1.5 to 21.7◦,
Figure 3A). The end behavior, “sameness call,” of our model for
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FIGURE 2 | Spatiotemporal similarity measure as the criterion for the decision on the uniqueness of the cause. Here we replicate a task where participants
were asked to report if two cross-modal stimuli emanated from a unique cause (Slutsky and Recanzone, 2001). While all features of the auditory stimulus were kept
fixed, they systematically varied the spatial position and the onset time of the visual stimulus and studied how the sameness report changes. (A) Spatiotemporal
similarity measure as a function of temporal disparity for different spatial disparities. (B) Spatiotemporal similarity measure as a function of spatial disparity for different
temporal disparities. (C) Sameness call as a function of temporal disparity for different spatial disparities. (D) Sameness call as a function of spatial disparity for
different temporal disparities. The values “1” and “0” for the sameness call indicate the same source and separate sources respectively. The symbols “sd” and “dt”
indicate the spatial (degrees) and temporal disparities (seconds) respectively. The gray dashed lines in (A,B) indicate the threshold applied to the similarity measure.
this task has already been validated by experimental results in
Section Inference of a Unique Cause for Cross-Modal Stimuli, the
yellow lines (very low temporal disparity) in Figures 2B,D, and
we want to show the internal dynamics here. Figure 3B shows the
similarity measure, represented in the multisensory dimension of
the decision variable, for the five spatial disparities. Figure 3C
shows the “sameness call,” represented in the multisensory
dimension of the decision result, for each spatial disparity. For a
fixed temporal structure, the similarity measure decreases when
the spatial distance increases. There is a point, around 10◦
of spatial distance for this case, where the decision about the
uniqueness of the cause changes. Our model proposes that the
reason is that the similarity measure drops below threshold, and
when this happens the unisensory plan with the higher saliency
wins and is executed (not shown here). These simulations show
how the temporal evolution of the internal system is influenced
when the spatial disparity between cross-modal stimuli varies,
sometimes leading to a change in decision through time (sd =
15.6 or 21.7◦ here).
Effect of Temporal Disparity
Temporal disparity is another feature that contributes to the
decision about the sameness of the cause of the signals (Wallace
et al., 2004; Chen and Vroomen, 2013). In Figure 4 we show
the simulations of our model under a task in which the visual
and auditory stimuli have fixed positions close to each other.
The duration of the auditory stimulus and visual stimulus are
fixed (0.3 s). As shown in Figure 4A, while the onset time of the
visual stimulus is fixed (0.2 s), the onset time of the auditory
stimulus varies systematically (from 0.25 to 0.45 s). The end
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FIGURE 3 | Effect of spatial disparity of cross-modal stimuli on target
selection. Five different conditions have been considered (illustrated by color
coding). The spatial and temporal features of the visual stimulus and the
temporal features of the auditory stimulus are fixed for all conditions. The
spatial position of the auditory stimulus changes in each condition. (A) The
spatial position of the visual stimulus and the five different spatial positions of
the auditory stimulus, in the five conditions, are shown. (B) The multisensory
component of the decision variable is shown for different conditions as a
function of time. It changes based on the spatial disparity of the stimuli in each
condition. The unisensory components do not change. (C) The multisensory
component of the decision result is shown for the different conditions. It is one
for smaller spatial disparities (indicating a common cause) and changes to zero
(indicating separate causes) when the spatial disparity exceeds the threshold
(shown as a dashed line in B).
behavior, “sameness call,” of our model for this task has already
been validated by experimental results in Section Inference of a
Unique Cause for Cross-Modal Stimuli, the blue lines (spatial
disparity around 7◦) in Figures 2A,C, and we want to show
the internal dynamics here. Figure 4B shows the similarity
measure, represented in the multisensory dimension of the
decision variable, for five temporal disparities. Figure 4C shows
the sameness calls, represented in the multisensory dimension
of the decision result. For a fixed spatial structure, the similarity
measure decreases when the temporal disparity increases. There
is a point, around 0.1 s of temporal disparity for this case,
that the decision about the uniqueness of the cause changes.
Based on the mechanism proposed in our model, the change
in the sameness call occurs when the spatiotemporal similarity
between the stimuli falls below threshold which leads to the more
reliable of the unisensory plans to win (not shown here). These
simulations show how the temporal evolution of the internal
system is influenced when the temporal disparity between cross-
modal stimuli varies, sometimes leading to a change in decision
through time [dt= 0.1(s) or 0.15(s) here].
Effect of Stimulus Reliability
For the cases in which there is a large spatiotemporal
misalignment between the two stimuli, human subjects often
infer that two separate sources exist (Chen and Vroomen, 2013;
Ursino et al., 2014) and plan a gaze-shift toward the more salient
of the two separate signals. In Figure 5 we show the performance
of ourmodel under a task in which the visual and auditory stimuli
are far from each other in space. The spatiotemporal structure is
fixed, and the reliability of the visual stimulus (0.5) is also not
changing. The variable factor is the reliability of the auditory
stimulus which is changing from unreliable (0.2) to highly reliable
(0.8) in four conditions (Figure 5A). Figure 5B shows how the
decision variable changes through time for the four conditions.
The multisensory (crosses) and visual dimensions (dashed lines)
of the decision variable are the same for all conditions, but the
auditory dimension is different under each condition because
the reliability of auditory stimulus changes. Figure 5C shows
result of the auditory plan winning, represented in the auditory
dimension of the decision result, for each condition. At the time
0.4 (s) the multisensory component of the decision variable drops
below the threshold (Figure 5B), the multisensory component
of the decision result changes from zero to one, the unisensory
component of the decision result (corresponding to the more
reliable stimulus) changes from one to zero, and two separate
sources are recognized. When the reliability of visual stimulus
is higher than the auditory stimulus the visual plan wins, and if
it is lower the auditory plan wins. These simulations show how
the temporal evolution of the internal system is influenced when
the reliabilities of stimuli vary, leading to selection of the more
reliable stimulus as the goal.
Effect of Evidence Accumulation
Accumulation of evidence may lead the decision to lean toward
an alternative category other than the currently preferred
category (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). This has been observed
in many oculomotor tasks, for instance, in “anti-saccade” task
where the subjects, by default, would plan a saccade toward
the presented target, unless some instructive cue commands
them to plan a saccade in the mirror opposite direction to the
target, in contrast to the default (Everling and Fischer, 1998;
Munoz and Everling, 2004). Another example is the “saccade
countermanding” task where the subject, by default, has to make
a saccade toward the visual target, unless some cue instructs
it to stop the motor plan and keep fixating (Hanes and Schall,
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FIGURE 4 | Effect of temporal disparity of cross-modal stimuli on
target selection. Five different conditions are considered (illustrated by color
coding). The spatial and temporal features of the visual stimulus and the
spatial features of the auditory stimulus are fixed for all conditions. The onset
time of the auditory stimulus varies from 0.25 to 0.45 s. (A) The temporal
profile of the visual stimulus (lower curve, fixed) and the auditory stimulus (5
upper curves, changing). (B) The multisensory component of the decision
variable is shown for different conditions as a function of time. It changes for
different conditions based on the temporal disparity of the stimuli in each
condition. The unisensory components (not shown) don’t change for different
conditions. (C) The multisensory component of the decision result is shown for
different conditions. It is “1” (single source) for smaller temporal disparities and
changes to “0” (multiple sources) when the temporal disparity exceeds the
threshold (shown as a dashed line in B).
1995; Schall et al., 2000). In our case, when stimuli from multiple
modalities are presented, we postulate that the default is to
assume a common cause for them. This default can be changed
to another decision, i.e., separate causes, by accumulation of
evidence over time. This concept has been materialized in our
model by the development of the similarity measure and its effect
on the decision result. We illustrate this concept in two tasks
shown in the left and right columns of Figure 6.
FIGURE 5 | Effect of the reliability of the unimodal stimuli on target
selection. Four different conditions are considered (illustrated by color coding)
The spatiotemporal features of both stimuli are fixed and are chosen such that
the similarity measure is always small enough that separate causes are
distinguished in all conditions. (A) The visual stimulus with fixed reliability is
shown by a square. The auditory stimulus with varying reliability is illustrated by
concentric circles of different levels of blur. (B) The decision variable is shown
for different conditions as a function of time. The visual (thick dashed line) and
multisensory components (line of crosses) are the same for all conditions. The
auditory component (solid colored lines) varies between different conditions
based on the reliability of the auditory stimuli, as shown in (A). (C) The decision
result for the auditory component is shown for different conditions as a
function of time. The multisensory component (line of crosses) is the same for
all conditions. The auditory component is unity when the reliability of the
auditory stimulus is higher than the visual stimulus and changes to zero when
the auditory stimulus is more reliable than the visual stimulus. The visual
component of decision changes in the opposite way.
The left column shows themodel’s predictions for a case where
two stimuli are presented at fixed positions close to each other.
As illustrated in Figure 6A, the duration of time that the stimuli
are present is varied (from 0.25 to 0.55 s). Figure 6B shows the
similarity measure, represented in the multisensory dimension of
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FIGURE 6 | Effect of accumulation of evidence about cross-modal stimuli on changing target selection decision. In each of the columns (A–F) four
different conditions are considered (illustrated by color coding). In the left column, the temporal features of the two stimuli are exactly the same. The stimuli are
presented at a fixed, small spatial distance from each other in all conditions. Only the duration of presentation of the stimuli varies for the different conditions (from 0.25
to 0.55 s). In the right column, the spatial and temporal features of the visual stimulus are fixed (purple curve in D). The two stimuli have a same onset time (0.2 s) and
are presented at a fixed distance from each other, in all conditions. However, the duration of presentation of the auditory stimulus changes from 0.25 to 0.55 (s)
(curves 1–4 in D). (A,D) temporal profiles of the stimuli. (B,E) The multisensory component of the decision variable is shown for different conditions as a function of
time. It changes for different conditions. The unisensory components do not change for different conditions (not shown). The threshold value is shown as a horizontal
dashed line. (C,F) The multisensory component of the decision result is shown for the different conditions. It is initially unity (common cause) first when the stimuli
appear. However, it may change to zero (separate causes) if and when enough evidence has accumulated to support the existence of two separate causes.
the decision variable (dvav), and Figure 6C shows the sameness
call, represented in the multisensory dimension of the decision
result (drav), developing across time. When the two stimuli are
presented briefly and at the same time, they are perceived as
belonging to a common source even if they are not presented
at exactly the same position in space. But for the same spatial
configuration, if the duration of stimulus presentation increases,
the similarity measure decreases. There is a point, around 0.4 s
of presentation duration for this case, that the decision about the
uniqueness of the cause changes.
The right column shows the model’s prediction for a case
where one stimulus appears briefly but the other stimulus might
stay on for a longer time. The auditory and visual stimuli,
presented at fixed positions very close to each other, have
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the same onset time (0.2 s) but the auditory stimulus is on
from 0.05 to 0.35 s longer than the visual stimulus (which
has a duration of 0.2 s; Figure 6D). Figure 6E shows the
similarity measure, represented in the multisensory dimension
of the decision variable, and Figure 6F shows the sameness call,
represented in the multisensory dimension of the decision result,
developing over time. By extending the presentation duration
of one stimulus, while the other is presented only briefly, the
similarity measure decreases. Therefore, the sameness decision
which was for a common source for shorter durations changes to
being for separate sources for longer durations. These examples
show that the default decision (that stimuli arise from a common
cause) can be altered over a period of time during which evidence
accumulates indicating (perhaps) that they are in fact separate.
The duration over which evidence needs to accumulate may
correspond to the temporal binding window.
DISCUSSION
In summary, we have proposed a computational model of the
cognitive internal system underlying causal inference in spatial
localization of cross-modal stimuli. The emerging output of this
internal system (report of sameness), not itself, is measurable by
psychophysicists. We first showed that our model can replicate
the behavioral reports of the perception of a common cause
measurable in psychophysical experiments. Having verified the
model, we then moved on to illustrate the dynamics of the
decision variable and decision result when spatial and temporal
features of the stimuli were changing, like the existing tasks.
We then showed the system dynamics for novel situations were
separate causes would be inferred or when the decision would
change from common to separate sources through evidence
accumulation. These dynamic simulations may be tested by new
experiments that force the subject’s report at specific times and
see if the decision changes based on the timing of this forced
decision.
Importantly, this new model incorporates several novel
features that we expect to be valuable for understanding
multisensory integration in the real brain. Based on the ability
of our model to replicate known behavioral results (References),
and contingent on the further verification of our model’s
new predictions, we propose that (1) the brain’s distributed
working memory is multisensory and should retain and process
the sensory information to perform this task. (2) Separate
computational units are required for representing alternative
plans (probably in the cortex) whose selective inhibition (perhaps
through basal ganglia connections to cortex) implements the
result of the decision. (3) A central decision-making unit
should exist capable of applying decision rules, and choosing
between multiple causal scenarios based on sensory evidence.
(4) Our spatiotemporal similarity measure, capturing how
similar the spatial and temporal features of the stimuli are,
is the criterion for inferring a common cause. In short, we
suggest that the real brain incorporates similar features as
our model at the computational level. Further, the current
computational-level model is constructed in such a way as
to provide a potential formal framework for models that
generate physiological predictions at the level of single units and
networks.
Finally, the model framework that we have proposed here
(simulating causal inference from one visual and one auditory
stimulus) has the potential to generalize to a number of other,
more complex situations where working memory is a limiting
factor. For example: (1) one can tackle target selection between
more than two stimuli (Schall and Hanes, 1993; Hill and
Miller, 2010) by enhancing the capacity of our short-term
memory, increasing the number of possible plan representations
and the dimensions of the decision variable, and defining a
multi-dimensional distance variable. (2) One can address causal
inference and integration for other modality combinations like
visual/tactile and auditory/tactile (Menning et al., 2005; Katus
et al., 2015). (3) One can address a situation where a subject
has a prior expectation of where the target would appear (Van
Wanrooij et al., 2010). When the target is presented one has
a causal inference problem to solve, which is whether or not
the presented and expected signals are the same, and whether
or not to integrate the internal and sensory representations. (4)
One can extend the features of the stimuli to include semantic
or emotional values (Robertson, 2003). This requires expansion
of our concept of similarity to include the more cognitive and
linguistic aspects assigned to the stimuli.
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NOMENCLATURE
EV(t) =


extv
relv
echv
ecvv

 : visual signal
=


existence
reliability
horizontal position
vertical position


EA(t) =


exta
rela
echa
ecva

 : auditory signal
=


existence
reliability
horizontal position
vertical position


EM(t) =


lkmv
relmv
echmv
ecvmv
lkma
relma
echma
ecvma


: multisensory memory
=


leak
reliability
horizontal position
vertical position
leak
reliability
horizontal position
vertical position


−−−→
PL_V (t) =

 salplvechplv
ecvplv

 : visual plan in plan layer
=

 saliencyhorizontal position
vertical position


−−−→
PL_A (t) =

 salplaechpla
ecvpla


: auditory plan in plan layer
=

 saliencyhorizontal position
vertical position


−−−−→
PL_AV (t) =

 salplavechplav
ecvplav

 : multisensory plan in plan layer
=

 saliencyhorizontal position
vertical position


−−−→
EX_V (t) =
[
echexv
ecvexv
]
: visual plan in execution layer
=
[
horizontal position
vertical position
]
−−−→
EX_A (t) =
[
echexa
ecvexa
]
: auditory plan in execution layer
=
[
horizontal position
vertical position
]
−−−−→
EX_AV (t) =
[
echexav
ecvexav
]
: multisensory plan in execution layer
=
[
horizontal position
vertical position
]
DIST (t) =
[
dist
]
: spatial distance
−−→
DISP(t) =
[
lkdisp
disp
]
: spatiotemporal disparity
=
[
leak
spatiotemporal disparity
]
SIM (t) = [sim] : spatiotemporal similarity
−→
DV (t) =

 dvvdva
dvav


: decision variable
=

 bid of visual planbid of auditory plan
bid of audiovisual plan


−→
DR (t) =

 drvdra
drav

 : decision result
=

 result of visual planresult of auditory plan
result of audiovisual plan


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